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Abstract: Is the United States in full retreat from internationally recognized regulatory best 
practice? Or is it instead headed toward some different destination – "dancing to the beat 
of a different drummer"? Where is this likely to lead? 
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"If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is 
because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music which 
he hears, however measured or far away." 
Henry David Thoreau, Walden, 1854 
 
n a widely read white paper that I wrote while at the FCC in 2002 (FCC, 
2002a) 1, I argued that the then-nascent European regulatory framework 
for electronic communications should generally reach regulatory 
conclusions similar to those of the United States. The U.S. and the EU had 
similar pro-competitive objectives. U.S. regulators over the prior forty years 
had been consistently reaching conclusions that would have been logical 
outcomes under the new European system. 
In revisiting these themes a scant three years later, I find that subsequent 
experience no longer supports them. On the one hand, the European system 
is in full swing, and the system that seemed novel and radical three years 
ago is generally functioning as was expected and hoped (European 
Commission, 2004; 4th ZEW Conference, 2004). What has radically changed 
is telecoms regulatory practice in the United States. The U.S., in a long 
                     
1 The article and derivative works also appear in CRANOR & WILDMAN, 2003; in the Journal 
on Telecommunications and High Technology Law 111 (2003); and in the 2004 Annual Review 
of the European Competitive Telecommunications Association (ECTA). The original white paper 
is available at: 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-224213A2.pdf 
I
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series of regulatory decisions, has largely abandoned its long-standing 
regulatory principles and moved in an entirely new direction. 
The European sector-specific regulatory system for electronic 
communications rests primarily on formal mechanisms of market definition, 
determination of Significant Market Power (SMP), and imposition of 
proportionate (minimally adequate) remedies if, and only if, SMP is present. 
These core elements are implemented in a technologically neutral, all-
embracing framework that is harmonized with European competition law. 
Telecommunications law and regulation in the United States lacks this 
elegant formal structure, it emphatically lacks technological neutrality, and it 
largely pre-empts the operation of competition law (antitrust). Nonetheless, 
U.S. law implicitly recognizes market power by identifying categories of 
telecommunications carriers who could reasonably be presumed to possess 
it. Moreover, U.S. law and regulation until roughly 2002 generally assigned 
an array of obligations (obligations similar to European SMP remedies) to 
carriers who were presumed to possess market power, including: 
interconnection, non-discrimination, transparency, unbundling of loops (and 
other elements), accounting separation and controls on pricing. 
Consequently, it seemed to me that the U.S. and the EU should generally 
reach similar regulatory conclusions, despite major differences in their 
regulatory processes. 
That conclusion turns out to have been incorrect. The U.S. subsequently 
reached one regulatory conclusion after another that would have been 
implausible or impossible under the European regulatory framework. 
In a series of rulings over the past few years, the FCC has systematically 
deregulated wired facilities, especially those used in support of broadband 
Internet services 2. Deregulation is generally viewed globally, and in Europe 
specifically, as the appropriate response to the emergence of competition. 
As SMP fades, remedies are no longer necessary. 
The concern that must be raised with this series of FCC rulings is that 
none of them contains any economic analysis worthy of the name. Indeed, in 
                     
2 Given that communication networks are expected to evolve into some kind of IP-based 
structure in the coming years, and that the facilities in question include the last mile where 
market power is most likely to be present, these rulings have the prospect of effectively 
eliminating all regulation of wired communications over time. 
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reading the rulings, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they refrain 
from rigorous analysis because they know that it would not support the 
desired conclusions 3. Instead, they deregulate in response to non-binding 
statements of intent on the part of wired incumbents, and in the hope that 
new technologies might generate sufficient competition at some unspecified 
time in the distant future to warrant the deregulation granted in the present 4. 
The regulatory system in the U.S. has thus been characterized in recent 
years by deregulation, despite the likely presence (at least in some relevant 
geographic markets) of SMP. 
Several other factors are reinforcing an apparent abandonment of pro-
competitive principles and a tilt toward the wired incumbents including: 
- a series of large-scale mergers, permitted with only minimal conditions 
imposed on the parties 5, 
- an apparent willingness to impose new regulations – in at least one 
case, harsh and lopsided regulations 6 (MARCUS, forthcoming) – only 
when they disadvantage new entrants to a greater degree than wired 
incumbents, 
- as regulatory changes cause financial losses at formerly competitive 
firms, forcing market exit or acquisition, funds for pro-competitive 
lobbying decrease correspondingly. In the context of the U.S. regulatory 
and political system, this creates a feedback loop, reinforcing the 
regulatory tilt. 
So regulators are abdicating at the very moment that the industry is 
consolidating. Where is all of this likely to lead? 
It is important to bear in mind that there are fundamental differences 
between the U.S. market and that of most European countries. Cable TV is 
far more prevalent in the U.S. than in most European countries. In the U.S., 
the suppression of competitive market entrants leads, not to monopoly, but 
rather (for the foreseeable future) to duopoly. More precisely, it leads to a 
series of non-overlapping geographically specific duopolies for wired 
broadband services at the retail level in most parts of the United States, and 
                     
3 In the MMDS/ITFS NPRM, the FCC inadvertently let slip their (probably correct) assessment 
that the market for wired broadband was highly concentrated, thus contradicting their contention 
in the other proceedings. 
4 We discuss the proceedings at greater length below. 
5 See below. 
6 See below. 
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to continued decline in an already patently ineffective wholesale market for 
wired broadband access 7. 
This is not to suggest that the FCC's commissioners all woke up one 
morning, miraculously and simultaneously inspired with the notion that 
duopoly was the very thing that America needed. To the contrary, these 
effects are more likely to have been inadvertent than intentional. Intent 
aside, a long series of U.S. government actions (discussed in the following 
sections of this paper) have tended to strengthen wired incumbents at the 
expense of new market entrants. These decisions are mutually consistent 
and synergistic; moreover, they appear to have had considerable collective 
effect. This is not a cheerful result. In economic terms, duopoly is not a good 
thing. It is not something to be sought out (except perhaps by the 
duopolists). The best that one can say is that it is a lesser evil than 
monopoly. 
For the moment, one must say in fairness that the economic results to 
date are mixed. In terms of consumer welfare, they may not be as negative 
as one might otherwise anticipate. The future implications depend heavily on 
the success or failure of local telephony incumbents with video services 
transmitted over Fiber to the Home (FTTH) – if FTTH is widely deployed and 
widely adopted, and to the extent that it leads to effective competition for 
triple-play services, the U.S. might conceivably wind up with an enviable 
electronic communications environment. 
Nonetheless, this is a radically different long-term vision from that of 
Europe. Moreover, it is a duopolistic world in which neither market forces nor 
regulation can be presumed to adequately protect consumer welfare. 
The next section of this paper describes the FCC's deregulatory rulings, 
which fail to properly analyse possible SMP. We then briefly consider two 
recent orders that appear to impact new entrants more than incumbent fixed 
providers. The subsequent section contains a few brief remarks on the trend 
towards industry consolidation. We then consider the economic implications 
of the system that appears to be on the horizon. The last section contains 
concluding remarks. 
                     
7 Neither ILECs nor cable TV providers have been motivated to compete outside of their 
respective incumbent regions to date. The impending SBC/ST&T and Verizon/MCI mergers will 
give the merged entities increased ability, but not necessarily increased incentive, to compete 
out of region. 
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  Deregulation failing to account for SMP 
In the interest of brevity, we confine ourselves to only the most 
noteworthy proceedings, and to those directly relevant to wired broadband 
Internet access: 
Shared access to DSL 
The FCC eliminated the obligation for incumbents to provide shared DSL 
access to competitors (FCC, 2003) 8. Prior to its elimination, this program 
had effectively spurred deployment and competition (KAHN, 2001) 9. 
Unbundling obligations for last mile fiber 
The FCC decided not to require loop unbundling for fiber-to-the-
premises, ostensibly in order to spur deployment 10. 
Internet access via cable modem 
Access to the Internet sold bundled with cable modem access was 
declared to be an information service, making it by default exempt from 
common carrier regulation. Possible SMP associated with last mile facilities 
was not addressed (FCC, 2002b). 
Internet access via DSL 
Access to the Internet sold bundled with DSL access was declared to be 
an information service, making it by default exempt from common carrier 
regulation (FCC, 2005a). 
Non-discrimination obligations and obligations to offer DSL at wholesale 
These obligations were eliminated for all wired broadband connections 
offered by telecommunications carriers (FCC, 2005) 11. The FCC asserts 
                     
8 This decision was triggered by a case in the D.C. Circuit: USTA, 290 F.3d at 429 (citing Iowa 
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 386-88). 
9 In light of Prof. Kahn's virulent opposition to unbundling in general, his modest support for line 
sharing (shared access) is striking. 
10 TRO (Triennial Review Order). The order was effectively expanded to include multiple 
dwelling units by the FCC's Order on Reconsideration released August 9th, 2004. 
11 The Computer Inquiry obligations were badly in need of revision in any case; moreover, the 
FCC had stopped enforcing them some years prior to this action. Nonetheless, the possibility of 
future enforcement continued to serve as an important safeguard to competition. 
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that the wholesale market for DSL and cable modem Internet access 
services is effective, and will remain so in the absence of regulation. 
To put this in a European context, these FCC proceedings have had the 
collective effect of breaking most of the rungs on the "ladder of investment" 
whereby new entrants would seek to progressively grow their businesses. 
European broadband adoption and deployment took off in the 2003-2005 
period through the combined effect of (1) local loop unbundling (LLU), (2) 
shared access, (3) bitstream access, and (4) resale (European Commission, 
2004; IEEE Communications Magazine, 2005). In the United States, the only 
rung that solidly remains is the unbundling of copper loops. European 
experience strongly suggests that LLU alone is not sufficient to ensure a 
robustly competitive market. 
In general, these proceedings were justified on the basis of encouraging 
broadband deployment. None contains an SMP analysis that an economist 
would credit. If a European member state had notified it of such an analysis, 
the Commission would have sent the country home packing with polite – or 
perhaps not so polite – instructions to come back when they had done the 
job properly. 
This reflects an important difference between telecoms regulation in the 
EU and the U.S. In Europe, the regulator is required to make decisions that 
are transparent and objective; furthermore, meta-regulation at the European 
level provides standards by which those decisions are to be made (Directive 
2002/20.EC). In the U.S., by contrast, nothing prevents the supposedly 
expert agency from making subjective decisions 12 (TABELLINI, 2002). 
Courts may intervene if these decisions are contrary to law, but the courts 
lack a consistent basis for intervening where decisions are flawed in a public 
policy sense. They could in principle reject a decision based on flawed 
analysis as "arbitrary and capricious", but only if the judges understand the 
subject matter well enough to recognise the flaws. In practice, there is a 
strong tendency to defer to the nominally expert agency 13. 
                     
12 From the perspective of political science, this is arguably a flaw in the U.S. system. Since 
regulators lack political accountability, it is essential that they operate within a defined 
framework of regulatory accountability. 
13 In legal terms, this deference is referred to as the Chevron doctrine (based on the court case 
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)). In its 
recent ruling in the Brand X case (2005), the Supreme Court put it this way: "If a statute is 
ambiguous, and if the implementing agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a 
federal court to accept the agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading 
differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation." 
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The combined effect of these proceedings has been to substantially 
eliminate all regulatory obligations associated with last mile Internet access 
facilities, at both wholesale and retail levels, without consideration of 
whether SMP might be present in the underlying transmission facilities or 
not. Moreover, deregulation was carried out in a manner that makes it 
particularly difficult to subsequently reimpose remedies should they prove to 
be necessary. 
The recent FCC decision eliminating wholesale obligations specifically 
argues that wholesale competition is not essential to effective retail 
competition (and then fails to rigorously analyse either). In Europe, we strive 
to ensure effective markets at the wholesale level, in order to avoid the need 
to regulate at the retail level. 
These effects were reinforced by other FCC actions that served to benefit 
wired incumbents and to impede new entrants who offered traditional voice 
services. A particularly noteworthy ruling eliminated the most popular and 
cost-effective form of local loop unbundling, UNE-P 14. Other FCC 
proceedings effectively deregulated prices on private lines within a 
metropolitan area. The combined effect of these two rulings has been to 
increase the cost of a number of critical inputs that Internet service providers 
(ISPs) need, and to cause many actual or potential competitive suppliers to 
the ISPs (including MCI and AT&T) to exit the market or be acquired. 
It is not my intent to argue the absolute rightness or wrongness of any 
particular one of these decisions 15. Rather, I observe that they collectively 
set a course that is very much at odds with pre-existing U.S. policy, and also 
with European notions of regulatory best practice. 
Had such a regulatory course been followed in Europe, competition law 
might have provided a partial correction. That is not possible in the United 
States. Pursuant to a number of court cases, competition law is largely pre-
empted where sector-specific regulation is possible 16. More specifically, the 
provisions of the Communications Act do not constitute a separate cause of 
antitrust action. It is also worth noting that competition law in the United 
                     
14 This was the result of a series of rulemakings and court decisions beginning with the TRO, 
op. cit. 
15 In the case of FTTH, for example, some form of "regulatory holiday" was probably 
appropriate. 
16 Notably Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp. 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000) and Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 294 F.3d 307 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
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States differs in many ways from that of Europe – for example, if a firm has 
achieved market power through legal means, it is not illegal to charge a 
monopoly price. 
  Hobbling new entrants 
The record on this point is not clear-cut, but there are reasons to suspect 
that this may be an emerging problem. Some of what follows is speculative. 
In recent years, it has been rare for new obligations to be imposed on 
wired telephone providers or on cable TV providers. Both industries maintain 
effective lobbying organizations. 
Nonetheless, two significant orders impose new obligations on Voice 
over IP (VoIP) providers that interconnect with the Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN), and one of them also imposes obligations on 
broadband Internet access providers. The first requires interconnected VoIP 
providers and broadband Internet access providers to instrument their 
networks in advance in order to facilitate any requests that they may get for 
lawful intercept (such as wiretaps). The second requires interconnected 
VoIP providers to fully support the most enhanced form of access to 
emergency services (E-911) by means of access to the E-911 services 
provided by wired incumbents. 
That both orders were adopted at all suggests that wired incumbents did 
not lobby aggressively against them. A possible reason suggests itself 
immediately: the wired incumbents had already internalized most of the cost 
associated with these regulations, and thus had no reason to oppose them. 
On the one hand, they had expected to eventually be subject to these 
mandates; on the other, their implementations drew heavily on capabilities 
already in place for their conventional PSTN operations. 
The costs to new entrants, however, are significant. Thus, incumbents 
could reasonably conclude that these orders provided them, all things 
considered, with a significant competitive advantage. 
Some regulatory obligations for lawful intercept and for access to 
emergency services were entirely appropriate. What is striking in the case of 
the emergency services order, however, is the degree to which it imposes 
harsh, lopsided, even Draconian regulation on new market entrants 
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(MARCUS, forthcoming). Given the VoIP industry's active engagement with 
the emergency services community, and their significant investment in 
customer education on this point 17, it is difficult to understand the rationale. 
The order provides a time frame of only 120 days to fully implement the 
system. (By contrast, mobile operators have been working on E-911 
systems for many years.) It recognizes that the order, by effectively forcing 
new entrants to use the E-911 access of the wired incumbents, creates 
incumbent market power, but it fails to adequately address the issue. It 
required VoIP providers to obtain confirmation from 100% of their customer 
base that the customer had read and understood any limitations in the 
provider's emergency service capabilities within just 30 days of publication of 
the order – a requirement so extreme as to be unenforceable. (The date has 
already been extended twice.) The order recognizes the technical 
infeasibility of reliably determining the physical location of nomadic VoIP 
users, but goes on to impose the same aggressive 120-day implementation 
schedule for an error-prone and incompletely specified system of self-
registration. 
It is not yet clear whether this apparent willingness to impose regulation 
that has the effect of hobbling new entrants should be viewed as a trend, or 
merely as an anomaly. "A single swallow doth not a summer make" 18. Two 
swallows? Perhaps still not. We should watch the skies to see if more 
swallows appear. 
  Industry consolidation 
The elimination of regulatory support for competitive providers appears to 
have had a significant financial impact on them. The results vary from firm to 
firm, with some becoming less profitable or unprofitable, some being forced 
into bankruptcy, some exiting the market, and some choosing to be 
acquired. 
                     
17 Based on my own experience as a Vonage customer, I would say that Vonage did 
everything that could have been asked of it, and more, to inform customers of capabilities and 
limitations in their emergency services capabilities. 
18 The expression is said to originate with a British physicist who was skeptical of the inference 
of a relationship between sunspots and the aurora borealis. In that case, the inference proved to 
be correct. 
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Most notable among recent acquisitions are: 
- Cingular's acquisition of AT&T Wireless, 
- SBC's acquisition of AT&T, 
- Verizon's acquisition of MCI. 
Two years ago, the U.S. mobile telephone industry included six 
nationwide players, and was characterised by intense competition. Today, 
with the Cingular/AT&T Wireless and the Sprint/Nextel mergers, there are 
four nationwide players – still enough to provide a reasonable level of 
competition. But the two largest firms are both controlled by fixed 
incumbents (Verizon Wireless by Verizon, Cingular by SBC and Bell South). 
Competition is probably still quite adequate; however, there are grounds for 
wondering whether this complex cross-ownership landscape will serve to 
limit the degree to which the competitive mobile industry serves as a check 
on the ability of wired incumbents to exploit market power. 
A few years ago, the United States had a vigorous competitive market for 
long distance services comprised primarily of AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and 
WorldCom (prior to the WorldCom/MCI merger). This market has eroded 
through normal evolutionary processes, not as a regulatory failure. Instead 
of constituting a distinct service, long distance became merely a feature of 
mobile and fixed telephony. AT&T and MCI were motivated to be acquired 
partly by the decline in their respective core long distance markets, and 
partly by the decline in their competitive local provider (CLEC) business 
precipitated by the elimination of UNE-P noted earlier. 
The absorption of AT&T and MCI by local wired incumbents will probably 
prove to be problematic for another reason. AT&T and MCI were the only 
firms other than the incumbents that operated significant metropolitan fiber 
access rings in most major cities in the United States. The mergers will 
result in substantial increases in the cost of private lines within metropolitan 
areas, which will increase costs for new entrants, thus impeding market 
entry. The Department of Justice mandated divestitures, but they are grossly 
inadequate 19. Firstly, they relate to just 789 buildings across the U.S. 
Secondly, the divestitures totally ignore the disincentives for Verizon to 
compete aggressively with SBC, and vice versa. Thirdly, the undertakings 
permit separate purchasers in each metropolitan area, thus enabling the 
divesting parties to ensure that no purchaser acquires a sufficient footprint to 
                     
19 The case filings are available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/sbc2.htm and: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/verizon.htm. 
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compete effectively 20. The FCC obtained some additional merger 
undertakings, but even should those commitments prove to be effective they 
are scheduled to lapse in 24 to 30 months (FCC, 2005b). Higher costs for 
new entrants appear to be in the cards. 
The net impact of industry consolidation, in a political economy sense, is 
quite marked. There are very few companies of any size remaining that have 
an interest in furthering pro-competitive regulation. Many of those that 
remain are ill-equipped to make substantial lobbying expenditures. The 
commercial interests of cable TV providers and of wired telephony 
incumbents will tend to be primarily to maintain, enhance or create market 
power. 
In the context of the United States, this has to be viewed as a serious 
concern. The system is sensitive to lobbying dollars. Furthermore, there is 
little prospect of consumer advocacy groups correcting the imbalance – they 
lack not only money, but also privileged access to decision makers. The risk 
of a self-reinforcing cycle of regulatory capture is worrying. 
  Economic implications 
To a European, it is natural to assume that the potential evolution of the 
U.S. broadband marketplace – and thus eventually of the totality of the U.S. 
communications market – into local duopolies will necessarily result in a 
massive loss of consumer welfare. 
It is important to remember that there are appreciable differences 
between the U.S. communications marketplace and that of most European 
countries. In most European member states, cable TV has only limited 
deployment and adoption. In many, the wired fixed telephony incumbent 
controls the largest mobile operator. The wired incumbent is, to all intents 
and purposes, the only game in town. 
In the United States, competition between the cable TV industry (and 
broadcast satellite) with the telephony world provides a richer tapestry. Voice 
substitution with a still robustly competitive mobile industry serves as a 
                     
20 The party that divests assets is motivated to ensure that the acquiring party cannot make 
effective use of those assets. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has intensively 
studied the divestitures that took place in the early 1990s. The results are not encouraging. 
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further competitive check. Moreover, while long distance appears to be 
disappearing as distinct market with the absorption of AT&T and MCI, it may 
be too early to predict exactly how things will play out in the end. 
With all of this in mind, we proceed to consider likely developments in 
various segments of the U.S. telecommunications market going forward. 
Firstly, on the wired broadband side, competitive providers have never 
been a major force. Moreover, the FCC's systematic elimination of pro-
competitive regulation appears to have been effective – the market share of 
competitive providers (CLECs) has been flat or slightly declining over the 
past several years. The following graph of the relative proportions of DSL 
lines provided by RBOCs, other ILECs, and CLECs is based on FCC 
data 21. 
Figure 1: High-speed ADSL lines, by type of provider 
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As a percentage of all ADSL lines, CLEC lines were at 5.4% in June of 
2003 22. They have steadily declined since, arriving at a paltry 4.3% by 
December of 2004 23. 
                     
21 The graph is based on FCC semi-annual reports of broadband deployment, which are 
based, in turn, on data provided by carriers on FCC Form 477. The FCC data can be difficult to 
interpret, and difficult to rigorously compare to European data. For now, assume arguendo that 
cross comparison is not too far off. 
22 For ease of exposition, we choose to disregard some early data, which would not change our 
conclusions. 
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Figure 2 - CLEC high-speed ADSL lines as a percentage of all high-speed ADSL lines 
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To put these figures into a European context, consider that the 
corresponding overall figure for the EU25 is 30% (and increasing over time), 
and that by this metric the United States has achieved less competitive 
market entry for wired ADSL broadband services than 21 of the 25 EU 
member states, including all EU15 member states 24. The best that can be 
said of these results is that the United States has achieved a higher 
percentage of competitive DSL penetration to date than Slovenia, Estonia, 
Cyprus and Latvia. 
This competitive DSL supply at the wholesale level is essential in most 
European countries, as there tend to be few alternatives to the wired 
telephony network. France, for example, has obtained superb results in 
recent years thanks to shared access and bitstream access, which 
collectively represent a third of the market. Cable modem competition could 
not have driven sufficient competition in France – only 9% of the domestic 
broadband market reflects alternatives other than DSL. 
                     
23 These aggregate figures are not inconsistent with results of individual CLECs. Covad, a 
leading CLEC supplier of DSL, achieved 500,000 DSL lines in November, 2003, with annual 
growth of about 35%. Their Q3 2005 financial results reflect just 578,400 DSL lines in service, 
indicating that subsequent growth had nearly stalled, corresponding to a rate of less than 8% 
per year. See: http://www.covad.com/companyinfo/pressroom/pr_2005/102605_news.shtml. 
24 European Commission, 10th Implementation Report, Annex 2, page 77. These data are July 
2004, slightly earlier than the FCC data to which I am comparing them. 
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Figure 3 - Percentage of the European market of DSL lines held by incumbents  
July 2004 
 
Figure 4 - The French broadband market - July 2004 (*) 
Incumbent DSL Lines, 
2,270,407 , 46%
Full ULL,  13,066 , 0%Shared Access,  717,654 , 15%
Bitstream Access,  854,205 , 
17%
Resale,  635,155 , 13%
Cable, FTTH, WLL, PLC, 
Other,  425,000 , 9%
 
(*) Based on data from the 10th Implementation Report. This graph appeared in a previous 
paper by this author: "Broadband Adoption in Europe", IEEE Communications Magazine, April 
2005. 
At the same time, European member states that are fortunate enough to 
enjoy significant cable TV (or fiber) broadband deployment tend to 
experience exceptionally good broadband roll-out as a result of the 
combined effects of inter-modal competition and pro-competitive regulation 
of DSL facilities. This is especially true of Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
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Denmark, all of which enjoy significantly higher overall broadband 
penetration than the United States 25. Their experiences would appear to 
contradict any suggestion that the widespread availability of cable 
broadband necessarily implies that the regulator should suppress the 
wholesale market on the DSL side. 
Despite the lack of competitive ADSL supply at a wholesale level in the 
United States, most geographic areas enjoy a second source of broadband 
supply at the retail level. As of December 2004, 56.4% of the 38+ million 
high-speed lines (over 200 Kbps in at least one direction) in the United 
States were based on a cable TV service (coaxial cable) 26. This results in 
the gross market structure for wired and wireless broadband shown in figure 
5 below. 
Figure 5 - The U.S. retail broadband market (wired and wireless) – Dec. 2004 (*) 
ILEC DSL / other telco, 
14,134,865 , 37%
CLEC DSL / other telco, 
1,150,981 , 3%
Cable modem,  21,319,224 , 
57%
Other,  1,163,357 , 3%
 
(*) FCC July 2005 report, based on Form 477 data. 
Cable and telephone company executives appear to be increasingly 
inclined to mutually view each other as their most significant competitors. In 
a recent interview, Ed Whitacre (CEO of SBC), said: "I think the cable 
companies will be the biggest competitor across the footprint" 27. 
                     
25 European Commission, 10th Implementation Report. 
26 FCC July 2005 report, based on Form 477 data. 
27 Business Week (Online Extra), November 7th, 2005. See also the remarks of Jim Robbins, 
CEO of Cox, in a keynote speech at the Telecom 2005 conference, as reported at: 
http://www.phoneplusmag.com/hotnews/5ah261383243743.html. 
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One might not anticipate aggressive rivalry between cable and DSL 
under conditions approximating duopoly; nonetheless, prices for entry-level 
DSL service are low by global standards. Basic DSL with unlimited usage is 
typically available from large RBOCs on a promotional basis at prices in the 
neighbourhood of USD15 (just over EUR12) per month 28. This is, to be 
sure, a price for a slow service – of 13,817,280 high-speed DSL lines 
reported in December, 2004, only 5,695,548 provided speeds of at least 200 
Kbps in both directions 29. This implies that 58.8% of all DSL services in the 
United States are slower than 200 Kbps in one direction (generally 
upstream). The price nevertheless remains impressive. 
Retail prices for entry-level DSL services have been declining in the 
United States. Whether they will continue to do so is unclear. 
At present, there are a number of possible indications of real rivalry 
between cable operators and wired telephony incumbents. Cable operators 
have gradually amassed a customer base of some 3.7 million conventional 
voice customers over their cable plant (FCC, 2005c). This establishes the 
leading cable operators as significant CLECs. 
Conversely, some of the largest RBOCs have committed substantial 
investments in FTTH, and indications to-date are that they are making those 
investments and offering production services to customers. They are looking 
to establish so-called triple-play offers, as are cable operators, and to use 
them to lock in customers before the market settles into a new form. 
Potentially, both telephony carriers and cable operators will compete for 
customers with a package comprising voice, data, and video. 
For now, however, there are more questions than answers about the 
long-term prospects of rivalry between cable and telephony. Is the present 
rivalry real, or are operators merely putting on a show for the regulators? Is 
the rivalry likely to be sustainable over time? Will price competition continue, 
or will the industry settle into a comfortable duopoly pattern with 
supracompetitive rents? Will FTTH continue to roll out? Will operators 
succeed in getting the municipal franchise rights that they need? Will 
telephone carriers get the rights that they need to distribute the content that 
consumers want to watch? Will customers accept FTTH as a substitute for 
                     
28 For SBC, for example, this is typically offered for a one-year introductory period, after which 
the price reverts to the current rate. 
29 FCC July 2005 report, based on Form 477 data. 
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cable TV and DBS satellite? Will the incredible bandwidth of FTTH ultimately 
provide telephone companies with a "trump card" in their rivalry with cable 
operators? 
Returning to the wholesale market for broadband Internet access, it is 
difficult to analyse the significance of media other than DSL/telephony. The 
FCC either fails to systematically capture and report the data that would be 
needed to make an assessment, or else it systematically fails to capture and 
report it. 
It is consequently not altogether clear whether cable is relevant to the 
wholesale market for wired broadband (FCC's claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding). Cable operators have never been under an overall 
regulatory obligation to provide wholesale services to unaffiliated ISPs. 
Historically, the ISP Earthlink was explicitly given certain rights to third party 
access in the AOL-Time Warner merger, and was able to build a customer 
base on that foundation. The record indicates that other ISPs, who also had 
rights in that merger agreement, were unable to make effective use of them. 
There were contracts, but no subscribers to speak of.  
The cable industry may have concluded other contracts as well, but there 
are no indications that the number of subscribers through third party access 
to cable is sufficient to have a meaningful economic impact on rivalry at the 
wholesale level. 
Broadband alternatives may be important in the long run, but in the short 
term they do not appear to have much impact on the competitive landscape 
in the United States. 3G has played no significant role in the United States to 
date. Wireless alternatives such as WiFi and eventually WiMax might be 
important in the long run, but no one (including the FCC) has decent data on 
deployment to date, and it is doubtful whether they can provide any effective 
competitive constraint on wired broadband prices today. (The WiFi service in 
the Starbucks coffee shop across the street from my apartment in 
Washington, DC, did not represent a meaningful substitute for my Verizon 
DSL service). Broadband over powerline might be significant in time, or it 
might not. All of these options have varying degrees of long term potential, 
but in the short term none of them provides an effective competitive 
constraint. 
In short, the competitive landscape in the United States differs from that 
of most European countries in some important respects. Some 
consequences of current U.S. regulatory trends can be predicted with a 
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moderate degree of confidence, but many others remain highly speculative. 
The FCC's assessments in the series of proceedings noted earlier should be 
viewed as exceedingly optimistic and naïve, but the possibility that the FCC 
will ultimately get lucky cannot be excluded. 
 Concluding remarks 
A few years ago, it appeared that telecoms regulation in the U.S. and in 
the EU would routinely reach similar results, despite different underlying 
regulatory processes. Today, by contrast, it seems clear that the U.S. is 
moving in a different direction than Europe, and also in a different direction 
than U.S. regulatory policy prior to about 2002. The U.S. is, at best, dancing 
to the beat of a different drummer. 
On balance, the current U.S. approach seems more likely than not to 
lead to a less competitive environment than that enjoyed in the EU. It has 
already led to a vastly less competitive environment at the intra-modal 
wholesale level. At the same time, the U.S. environment differs from that of 
Europe in ways that might possibly serve to mitigate the potential negative 
impact. Many scenarios are possible, many of them bad, but not all of them 
irredeemably bad. 
A serious concern is that many of the actions that have been undertaken 
may be difficult to reverse. Even if it were to somehow find the political will, it 
is not clear that the FCC would have the statutory authority to effectively 
reverse certain of the changes that it has made. Nor is the Congress likely to 
provide a quick fix. Given the complexities of the political process in the 
United States, and the asymmetries emerging in the profitability (and thus 
the lobbying capabilities) of market participants, any actions taken by 
Congress are more likely to exacerbate problems than to correct them. The 
U.S. would thus appear to be committed to a trajectory from which it would 
be difficult to reverse or correct its course. 
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